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O P I N I O N  
   
 
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Lawrence Scott Ward appeals the District Court’s 
judgment of sentence.  Ward alleges several sources of error 
in the proceedings below, including a violation of Federal 
3 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 on the theory that the District 
Court improperly required that he deliver his allocution under 
oath.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence. 
 
I. Background 
 
On August 27, 2006, Ward arrived at Dulles 
International Airport after a trip to Brazil.  A search of 
Ward’s possessions revealed that he was in possession of 
child pornography.  Ward was arrested and indicted in the 
Eastern District of Virginia for that offense. 
 
After Ward’s arrest in Virginia, federal agents 
searched his office at the Wharton Graduate School of 
Business, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he served as 
an Emeritus Professor.  The search revealed numerous 
photographs and videos of Ward engaged in sex acts with 
minors later identified as J.D. and R.D.  The pictures and 
videos were taken in Brazil, where J.D. and R.D. lived.  A 
search of Ward’s email showed communications between 
Ward and J.D. and R.D. in which Ward requested that the 
boys engage in various sex acts, including having sex with 
other men chosen by Ward.  The investigation also exposed 
evidence that Ward had paid for J.D.’s housing and provided 
J.D.’s family with money. 
 
Between March and August 2006, Ward attempted to 
acquire a visa for J.D. to visit the United States.  During the 
visa application process, Ward made several false statements 
to State Department personnel, including misrepresentations 
that J.D.’s family was affluent when in fact it was destitute.  
4 
Ward allegedly did this to show that there was little risk that 
J.D. would overstay his visa. 
 
On May 17, 2007, after unsuccessfully attempting to 
consolidate the cases pending in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Virginia, Ward 
pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia case and 
received a sentence of 15 years of imprisonment.  On March 
13, 2008, Ward was indicted in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on two counts of shipping child pornography in 
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), 
and one count of false statements to a federal official, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  On August 21, 2008, the 
grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Ward 
with an additional two counts of inducing a minor to engage 
in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2251(a). 
 
On November 17, 2008, Ward pleaded guilty in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania case to all five counts of the 
superseding indictment.  At the sentencing hearing, the 
government requested and received a two-level sentencing 
enhancement because Ward’s conduct involved two victims.  
The District Court sentenced Ward to 300 months of 
incarceration, lifetime supervised release, a $100,000 fine, 
and a $500 special assessment.
1
  However, the District Court 
                                              
1
 The District Court originally intended not to impose a fine 
but to award restitution of $100,000.  When the prosecutor 
expressed concern about restitution because the victim, J.D., 
could not be found, the court responded, “so the $100,000 
will be a fine, not restitution.” 
5 
did not specify a particular sentence for each charge to which 
Ward pleaded guilty. 
 
Ward appealed the sentence to this Court on three 
grounds:  (1) challenging the two-level enhancement, (2) 
asserting that the District Court’s rationale for imposing a fine 
was flawed, and (3) arguing that his sentence was an 
impermissible general sentence.  We found no error in the 
District Court’s conclusion that Ward’s crime involved two 
victims.  United States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 183-84 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  We also held that the District Court, in switching 
the $100,000 from restitution to a fine, stated insufficient 
reasons for imposing that fine, but, because Ward did not 
object to the fine at sentencing, we concluded that this error 
was not plain.  Id. at 185-86.  Finally, we held that the District 
Court erred by failing to impose a separate sentence for each 
count of the superseding indictment.  Id. at 184.  This error 
was reversible; thus, we remanded the case to the District 
Court for resentencing.  Id. at 186. 
 
While his appeal was pending, Ward maintained 
contact with J.D. and R.D., who at this point had fathered 
children.  Ward attempted to establish a relationship with 
those children.  Additionally, Ward violated prison rules by 
spending money on other inmates and attempting to use his 
attorneys to make contact with his victims for non-legal 
reasons. 
 
At the resentencing hearing on February 9, 2012, the 
District Court personally addressed Ward, asking if he wished 
to speak on his own behalf.  When Ward indicated that he 
wished to make a statement, the District Court, over defense 
counsel’s objection, insisted that his allocution be delivered 
6 
under oath, pursuant to that judge’s individual practice.  Ward 
was placed under oath and proceeded to speak about his 
contrition for violating societal norms, his interest in 
rehabilitation, his personal struggle in coming to terms with 
the fact that he is a homosexual, his recent diagnosis of 
leukemia, and his hope that he would have a sentence short 
enough that he would not die in prison because he wanted to 
maintain his ties with family and friends.   
 
After Ward allocuted, the District Court sentenced him 
to the same prison term of 300 months of incarceration, but 
increased the fine from $100,000 to $250,000.  The District 
Court explained that the increased fine was not meant as 
punishment for Ward’s successful appeal of his sentence; 
rather, the court stated that the $250,000 fine was within the 
advisory range and that the amount was a reasonable figure 
which Ward had the means to pay.  The District Court also 
ordered that Ward have no contact with any person under 18 
years of age, especially his victims’ children in Brazil. 
 
II. Discussion2 
 
Ward challenges his sentence on seven independent 
grounds, arguing that his sentence should be vacated because 
(1) he had the right to deliver an unsworn allocution, (2) the 
District Court impermissibly increased his fine, (3) the 
government presented insufficient evidence to warrant a 
sentencing enhancement for Ward’s involvement in a pattern 
of prohibited sexual conduct, (4) the District Court did not 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
7 
adequately explain the reasons for choosing a 300 month 
sentence, (5) the District Court’s refusal to grant Ward’s 
request for a downward variance was procedurally 
unreasonable; (6) a 300 month sentence was substantively 
unreasonable, and (7) the District Court impermissibly failed 
to order restitution.  All of Ward’s arguments are unavailing. 
 
A. May the Court Require that Allocution be 
Sworn.
3
 
  
 Ward argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32 affords all criminal defendants the right to deliver an 
unsworn allocution.
4
  The issue of whether a criminal 
defendant has the right to an unsworn allocution is a matter of 
first impression in this Court and appears to be a novel 
question of federal law.  As with any analysis of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, our inquiry is guided by the text 
of the rule as well as its history and purpose.  See United 
States v. Higgs, 504 F.3d 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2007).  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that there is no right to 
                                              
3
 Following oral argument, the Court directed the United 
States to file a supplemental brief, stating the formal position 
of the Department of Justice as to whether a criminal 
defendant may be required to be sworn at a sentencing 
hearing – either at the beginning or immediately before 
allocution.  The Department of Justice filed such a brief.  
Ward was permitted to file a response and he did so.  This 
post-argument briefing has been considered in our resolution 
of this appeal. 
4
 Our review of a district court’s compliance with Rule 32 is 
plenary.  United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1013 (3d Cir. 
1993).   
8 
deliver an unsworn allocution.  We leave it to the unfettered 
discretion of the district courts to decide whether the 
defendant will be placed under oath during allocution.   
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
 “[T]he right of allocution is deeply rooted in our legal 
tradition” and dates back to at least the fifteenth century.  U.S. 
v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2001).  The rules of 
evidence in early English and American common law deemed 
criminal defendants “incompetent as witnesses.”  Ferguson v. 
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 & n.3 (1961) (citing 3 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 369 
(1769)).  As a result, they could not testify on their own 
behalf at trial or plead legal defenses like insanity or 
justification.  Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation:  
Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2641, 
2646-47 (2007).  Thus, allocution, before sentencing, was the 
defendant’s one chance to argue for mitigation.  Adams, 252 
F.3d at 282; Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. Rev. 115, 
120-21 (1944).  Although the right of allocution predates the 
founding of the Republic, it is not a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution.
5
  Adams, 252 F.3d at 282.   
                                              
5
 There is some authority in other circuits suggesting that the 
right of allocution may be protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 
F.2d 1523, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (habeas case, discussing right 
of allocution in state court); United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 
654, 656 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing right of defendant to be 
present at sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 
336 (4th Cir. 1978) (habeas case, discussing right of 
allocution in state court).  We do not adopt their reasoning. 
9 
 
 However, acknowledging the historical and common 
law roots of the right of allocution, Congress codified the 
right in 1944 by promulgating Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32.  Id. at 280 (citing Green v. United States, 365 
U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion)).  The text of Rule 32 
sets forth only two requirements:  the sentencing court must 
address the defendant personally and must permit the 
defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the 
sentence.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(a)(ii).  The rule is silent 
as to whether the allocution should be sworn or unsworn. 
There is no legislative history discussing whether a defendant 
should be allowed to deliver an unsworn allocution, nor do 
the committee notes address the question. 
 
The Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Green 
recognized the historical roots of the common law right of 
allocution, highlighting the equitable concern that a criminal 
defendant must always be asked if he has anything to say 
before sentence is imposed so that he has “the opportunity to 
present to the court his plea in mitigation.”  365 U.S. at 304.  
The rationale supporting this procedural requirement is that 
even “[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak 
for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting 
eloquence, speak for himself.”  Id.  Rule 32 was codified with 
this policy in mind.  Id. 
 
The cases decided since Green confirm that the critical 
purpose of Rule 32 is threefold:  (1) to allow the defendant to 
present mitigating circumstances, (2) to permit the defendant 
to present personal characteristics to enable the sentencing 
court to craft an individualized sentence, and (3) to preserve 
the appearance of fairness in the criminal justice system.  See 
10 
Thomas, Beyond Mitigation, 75 Fordham L. Rev. at 2643.  
Thus, allocution “is designed to temper punishment with 
mercy in appropriate cases, and to ensure that sentencing 
reflects individualized circumstances.”  United States v. De 
Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1
st
 Cir. 1994).  “Aside from 
[allocution’s] practical role in sentencing, the right ‘has value 
in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of the process,’” 
United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 18-459 (2d 
ed. 1980)), because the defendant is given the “right to speak 
on any subject of his choosing prior to the imposition of 
sentence.” Barnes, 948 F.2d at 328.   
 
The contemporary practice of swearing or not 
swearing defendants before a Rule 32 allocution varies by 
district and by judge.  Although no federal court has 
addressed the question of whether a Rule 32 allocution must 
be unsworn, our sister circuits have made passing references 
to both sworn and unsworn allocutions.  Compare, e.g., 
United States v. Kaniss, 150 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(noting that the defendant’s Rule 32 allocution was sworn), 
with United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 199 (2d Cir. 
2010) (noting that a defendant may deliver “an unsworn, 
uncrossed allocution”); see United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 
888, 924 n.79 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines allocution as an “unsworn statement” that 
“is not subject to cross examination”).  However, under Rule 
32, no court has ever held that a criminal defendant has an 
affirmative right to deliver an unsworn allocution.   
 
Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines do not 
distinguish between sworn and unsworn statements, 
permitting a sentence enhancement for any false statement, 
11 
whether sworn or not, made during an allocution.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; United States v. Parker, 594 F.3d 1243, 
1249-50 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying § 3C1.1 enhancement for 
a false statement made during the defendant’s allocution 
without distinguishing between sworn or unsworn 
statements).
6
   
 
2. Analysis 
 
We conclude from the above review that, although 
allocution may frequently be unsworn, neither the 
Constitution nor Rule 32 require that this be so.  Whether an 
allocution is sworn or unsworn does not affect a defendant’s 
right to make a statement to the sentencing court nor does it 
subvert the policy goals of Rule 32.  The reason for allocution 
is not to permit the defendant to re-contest the factual issues 
of innocence and guilt.  Rather, the purpose of allocution is to 
afford the defendant an opportunity to raise mitigating 
circumstances and to present his individualized situation to 
the sentencing court.  See Adams, 252 F.3d at 280; see also 
Shelton v. Carroll, 464 F.3d 423, 442 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding 
that the defendant had no constitutional right to make factual 
statements about his involvement in the crime during 
allocution in a capital case).   
 
Under existing jurisprudence, the defendant’s right of 
allocution is not unlimited.  The sentencing judge has always 
                                              
6
 The Application Note to § 3C1.1 states, without 
distinguishing between sworn and unsworn statements, that 
“providing materially false information to a judge or 
magistrate judge” is sufficient to warrant an enhancement.  
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 app. note 4(F).   
12 
retained the discretion to place certain restrictions on what 
may be presented during an allocution.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 657-58 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming district court’s refusal to allow the defendants to 
discuss their beliefs about environmental issues and civil 
disobedience); United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 
1997) (“[A] defendant’s right to allocution is not unlimited in 
terms of either time or content.”).  These decisions confirm 
that a sentencing judge may impose procedural limitations 
during an allocution, so long as the judge personally 
addresses the defendant and offers him the opportunity to 
address the court before the sentence is pronounced.  See 
United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(interpreting Rule 32 narrowly as imposing only its two stated 
requirements), abrogated on other grounds by United States 
v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000); see also United 
States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520, 523 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(confirming that Rule 32 has only two procedural 
requirements, but also holding that the sentencing judge must 
meaningfully consider the defendant’s statement during 
allocution). 
 
Moreover, when a defendant presents such a statement, 
the fact that the court puts the defendant under oath could 
have the effect of enhancing the credibility of the defendant’s 
presentation and leaving a more meaningful impression on 
the sentencing court.  See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 558 
(1965); Celine Chan, Note, The Right to Allocution:  A 
Defendant’s Word on its Face or Under Oath?, 75 Brook. L. 
Rev. 579, 582 (2009).  That being said, the Supreme Court 
has also noted that, regardless of whether the statement is 
sworn, all “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong 
13 
presumption of verity.”  Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 
74 (1977).   
 
We conclude, therefore, that the choice by a particular 
judge to require that the defendant be sworn for the allocution 
is not inconsistent with the procedural requirements of Rule 
32.   
 
Ward, however, argues that the District Court’s 
requirement of a sworn allocution overstepped the bounds of 
Rule 32 – that  
 
by placing Mr. Ward under oath as if he 
were appearing as a witness, the district court 
violated one of the essential attributes of the 
defendant’s historic and fundamental right to 
present a personal allocution prior to being 
sentenced.  This right includes an opportunity 
for the defendant personally to express remorse 
to the court, to explicate factors in mitigation, 
and to plead for mercy prior to the imposition of 
sentence, an opportunity that is by its nature and 
by hundreds of years of historical tradition both 
unsworn and without cross-examination.   
   
This concern is without merit.  As discussed above, the 
purpose of Rule 32 is to give the defendant an opportunity to 
speak about mitigating circumstances and offer his reasoning 
for a more lenient sentence.  Ward was free to address the 
sentencing court on any and all of these topics.  These are not 
topics that address the factual elements of guilt, which have 
already been decided by the jury.   
 
14 
We would also point out that, rather than exercising 
his right to allocution, Ward could have remained silent.  A 
risk in speaking at allocution, whether sworn or unsworn, is 
that the allocution statement can be used in subsequent 
criminal prosecutions.  See Harvey v. Shillinger, 76 F.3d 
1528, 1535 (10
th
 Cir. 1996) (“A defendant’s choice to 
exercise his right to allocution, like the choice to exercise the 
right to testify, is entirely his own; he may speak to the court, 
but he is not required to do so.”).  If the defendant is 
concerned about future use of his statement against him, it 
makes no difference whether the statement was sworn or not.  
See Whitten, 610 F.3d at 199 (holding that that prosecutors 
may use “an unsworn, uncrossed allocution” by a criminal 
defendant in a subsequent proceeding against the same 
defendant).
7
  Ward’s argument that an unsworn allocution 
                                              
7
 Ward also cites to a case from an intermediate Tennessee 
appellate court, State v. Keathly, 145 S.W.3d 123 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2003), which appears to be the only court to have 
addressed the right to an unsworn allocution.  The court in 
Keathly found a violation of the right of allocution because 
the defendant should have been “permitted to make an 
unsworn statement to the court without having been subjected 
to rigorous cross-examination.”  Id. at 130. 
 Keathly is distinguishable for two reasons.  First, the 
court interpreted Tennessee law (the text of which mirrors 
Rule 32) as granting the right to an unsworn allocution based 
on the definition of the term in Blalck’s Law Distionary.  Id. 
at 124.  The court did not engage in an analysis of the history 
or purpose of the right of allocution.  Instead, it just looked to 
the definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionary and cited 
an Eleventh Circuit case that cited the dictionary for the same 
proposition.  Id. at 125 (citing Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 924). 
15 
would have allowed him to deliver a more candid statement 
to the sentencing court is not persuasive.   
 
In sum, we conclude that the District Court retained 
the discretion to require Ward to deliver a sworn allocution.  
We find no basis to hold that the District Court violated Rule 
32 when it required Ward’s allocution to be sworn.  The 
District Court’s decision to place Ward under oath did not 
impinge upon Ward’s right to speak on his own behalf, nor 
did the administration of an oath affect Ward’s ability to 
present a plea of mitigation.  Consequently, we find that there 
was no violation of Ward’s right of allocution. 
 
                                                                                                     
 Second, and more importantly, the court held that the 
cross-examination during the defendant’s allocution was 
improper under Tennessee law because it transformed the 
function of the allocution far beyond an opportunity for the 
defendant to express contrition and request leniency.  Id. at 
129-30.  Indeed, the fact that the allocution was subject to 
cross-examination appears to be the dispositive issue in 
Keathly.  Here, however, Ward was not subject to cross-
examination.  For these reasons, we do not find Keathly to be 
persuasive.  
16 
B. The Remaining Grounds for Appeal
8
 
 
1. The Increase of Ward’s Fine From 
$100,000 to $250,000 
 
Ward claims that the District Court vindictively 
increased his fine at resentencing from $100,000 to $250,000, 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  The Due Process clause 
forbids judges from retaliating against a defendant for 
succeeding on an appeal by imposing a more severe sentence 
on remand.  See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 
(1969).  In such cases, the defendant is typically entitled to a 
presumption of vindictiveness, although the government may 
rebut the presumption by “proffering legitimate, objective 
reasons for its conduct.”  Esposito, 968 F.2d at 303 (citations 
omitted).  Additionally, the Supreme Court has limited 
application of the presumption to circumstances in which 
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the increased sentence 
is the product of actual vindictiveness.  Alabama v. Smith, 
490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989).  Where there is no reasonable 
likelihood of vindictiveness, the burden remains upon the 
defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.  Id. at 799-800. 
 
Here, the District Court acknowledged that the new 
fine was being imposed to correct an error identified by us in 
his earlier appeal, i.e., the failure to state sufficient reasons 
for imposing the fine.  The District Court then examined the 
                                              
8
 In challenges to the sentence, we review a district court’s 
factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review 
over its applications of legal precepts.  United States v. 
Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 
17 
relevant factors:  the Guidelines range, Ward’s ability to pay, 
and Ward’s crimes.  At the second sentencing, with this 
information at hand, the District Court arrived at the figure of 
$250,000 as an appropriate fine.  Additionally, the District 
Court explicitly stated that the increased sentence was not 
vindictive.  (While certainly not determinative, a district 
court’s statement of its aim and intention in pronouncing 
sentence is a factor to be considered in making a 
determination about vindictiveness.)  Ward offers no 
evidence of vindictiveness other than stating that he is entitled 
to a presumption of vindictiveness based on the increased 
fine. 
 
Assuming, however, that the presumption of 
vindictiveness applies, the particular facts of this case 
overcome the presumption.  First, as the government points 
out, the District Court never actually considered the 
appropriate factors when assessing a fine during the first 
sentencing, but it did so at the second sentencing. Second, and 
contrary to Ward’s assertion, there is evidence in the record 
that his sentence was partially based on the government’s new 
information presented at his second sentencing.  Specifically, 
after Ward objected to the imposition of the $250,000 fine, 
the government responded by saying:  “Let me say that from 
what I understand, the Court is intending to increase the 
amount of the fine based on the new information and not 
based on the fact that the defendant took an appeal.”  The 
District Court responded 
 
Absolutely.  It is not based upon that.  
My understanding of the opinion from the 3
rd
 
Circuit was that there was no basis in the 
previous sentencing for the imposition of the 
18 
$100,000.  And based upon the presentence 
report and the defendant’s financial 
background, the $250,000, which is under the 
guidelines, is a reasonable figure and he is in a 
position to afford that.  And so that’s the basis 
of that. 
 
The court’s statement confirms that the court analyzed 
the factors for imposing a fine.  That objective evidence, 
combined with the court’s statement is adequate on this 
record to overcome any presumption of vindictiveness.  
Given the lack of evidence or argument that there was actual 
vindictiveness, the District Court did not err in determining to 
increase Ward’s fine. 
 
Therefore, we reject Ward’s argument that the 
increased fine was vindictive. 
 
2. The Five Level Enhancement for 
Ward’s Engagement in a Pattern of 
Prohibited Sexual-Conduct 
 
Ward claims that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the District Court’s application of a five level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) for engaging in a 
pattern of prohibited sexual conduct.   
 
Section 4B1.5(b)(1) provides that, “[i]n any case in 
which the conviction is a covered sex crime and the defendant 
engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual 
conduct[,] [t]he offense level shall be [increased by] 5[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1).  The commentary to subsection (b) 
provides that a “defendant [has] engaged in a pattern of 
19 
activity involving prohibited sexual conduct if on at least two 
separate occasions, the defendant engaged in prohibited 
sexual conduct with a minor.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) app. 
note. 4(a).  Prohibited sexual conduct with a minor includes 
the production of child pornography .  Id.   
 
At Ward’s resentencing, the District Court made note 
of the entire record that had been submitted at his first 
sentencing and incorporated all findings made therein.  The 
District Court also received new evidence showing that Ward 
produced photos and videos of J.D. engaged in sex acts.  
When the District Court announced Ward’s new sentence, it 
stated that it was considering “not only the information that 
was given here today, but the information that was given 
previously about Mr. Ward’s contact with young people, 
young men, previously.”  Given the extensive evidence of a 
pattern of prohibited sexual conduct, the District Court did 
not err in imposing the five level enhancement under § 
4B1.5(b)(1). 
 
3. The Imposition of a Within-Guidelines 
Range Sentence 
 
Ward contends that his sentence should be vacated 
because the District Court failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(c)(1).   
 
Section 3553(c)(1) provides that, when the Guidelines 
range of the sentence spans more than 24 months, the 
sentencing court must explain “the reason for imposing a 
sentence at a particular point within the range”.  18 U.S.C. § 
3553(c)(1).  A sentencing court will satisfy the requirements 
of § 3553(c)(1) when it gives “concrete reasons for its choice 
20 
of sentences.”  United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 363 (3d 
Cir. 2002).   
 
Here, the Guidelines range for Ward’s sentence ran 
from 292 to 365 months—a span of 73 months.  The District 
Court imposed a 300-month sentence.  Before imposing the 
sentence, the District Court listed a variety of reasons why the 
sentence was necessary, including the seriousness of the 
crimes, Ward’s lack of respect for the law, his high risk of 
reoffending, and the need for general and specific deterrence.  
This was clearly a sufficiently detailed explanation of the 
reasons for Ward’s sentence.  See Lloyd, 469 F.3d at 326 
(holding that the sentencing court provided an adequate 
explanation for the defendant’s sentence when it discussed 
the defendant’s criminal history, the sentences received by his 
co-defendants, and the danger of his crime to society).  
 
Ward takes issue with the District Court’s failure to 
state why a 300 month sentence was more appropriate than 
any other sentence within the 292 to 365 month range.  This 
argument misconstrues the law.  The District Court did not 
have an obligation to state why a 300 month sentence was 
more appropriate than all other possible sentences.  Rather, 
the District Court needed only to state why the 300 month 
sentence was sufficient.  See Gricco, 277 F.3d at 363.   
Therefore, we reject Ward’s argument that the District Court 
failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).  
 
4. Ward’s Request for a Downward 
Variance  
 
Ward claims that he was entitled to a downward 
variance based on his age, physical and psychological 
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condition, and the atypically harsh conditions of confinement 
to which he was subject.  Ward argues that the District 
Court’s alleged failure to consider and appreciate the 
relevance of these factors rendered his sentence procedurally 
unreasonable.   
 
We may not overturn a sentence on procedural 
unreasonableness grounds when the sentencing judge has “set 
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has 
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”  Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  Here, the District 
Court did not disregard Ward’s arguments at sentencing.  The 
District Court specifically addressed and rejected each claim.  
The District Court’s consideration of Ward’s arguments for a 
variance adhered to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rita.  
Therefore, we will not disturb the sentence on procedural 
reasonableness grounds. 
 
5. Ward’s Sentence Is Not Substantively 
Unreasonable 
 
Ward argues that 300 months of incarceration is 
substantively unreasonable because the sentence exceeds his 
projected life expectancy.  We will affirm unless “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.”  Id. at 568.   
 
The fact that Ward may die in prison does not mean 
that his sentence is unreasonable.  See U.S. v. Watson, 482 
F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 2007).  Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, we are not convinced that Ward’s sentence—
22 
which is within the advisory Guidelines range—is 
substantively unreasonable.  The District Court found that 
Ward posed a grave danger to society and had committed 
serious crimes, thus necessitating a long sentence.  The 
District Court was well within its discretion to impose a 300 
month sentence.  We therefore reject Ward’s argument that 
his sentence is substantively unreasonable.   
 
6. Restitution 
 
Ward contends that the District Court failed to comply 
with 18 U.S.C. § 2259, which requires the sentencing court to 
order the defendant to pay restitution to his victims if their 
losses can be determined.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(3), & 
(b)(4)(A).  Ward now requests that we vacate his sentence 
and remand for resentencing so that the District Court can 
order restitution.  Ward did not object to the District Court’s 
decision not to order restitution at his resentencing.  As a 
result, we review the District Court’s decision for plain error.  
United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
Ward lacks standing to raise this challenge because 
only the crime victim, the crime victim’s legal representative, 
or the government may assert rights related to a restitution 
award.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1).  Therefore, his argument is 
meritless. 
 
Ward, however, asserts that he has standing because 
the imposition of a fine was directly related to the District 
Court’s inability to impose restitution.  This argument 
misconstrues the record on appeal.  On Ward’s first appeal, 
we noted that the District Court’s decision to impose a fine 
instead of restitution was improper because “the Court simply 
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translated the intended restitution into a fine owed to the 
government, without engaging in any analysis as to why a 
fine was appropriate and despite it having appeared . . . that 
no fine would be imposed.”  Ward, 626 F.3d at 185-86 
(citation omitted).  At Ward’s resentencing, as noted above, 
the District Court did not translate the intended restitution 
into a fine.  Instead, the District Court considered the factors 
relevant to the imposition of a fine, consistent with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3572.  Based on the record before us, the District Court’s 
decision to impose a fine at resentencing was unrelated to its 
decision not to order restitution.  We therefore will not 
consider Ward’s argument that the relatedness of the fine and 
restitution gives him standing to challenge the failure to order 
restitution.   
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence. 
